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INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE1 
 Amici Curiae (“Amici”), which file this Brief with the consent of all 
the parties, are individual physicians and an association of physicians 
having a membership that spans the nation.  Amici file this brief in 
support of the Commonwealth of Virginia (“The Commonwealth” or 
“Virginia") (Appellee/Cross-Appellant) and in opposition to Kathleen 
Sebelius, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, in 
her Official Capacity (“The Secretary”) (Appellant/Cross-Appellee). 
 Since 1943, Amicus Association of American Physicians and 
Surgeons, Inc. (“AAPS”) has been dedicated to the highest ethical 
standards of the Oath of Hippocrates and to preserving the sanctity of the 
patient-physician relationship.  AAPS has filed numerous amicus curiae 
briefs in noteworthy cases like this one.  See, e.g, Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 
U.S. 914 (2000)(citing an AAPS amicus brief). Because AAPS has also 
commenced an action against The Secretary which contains overlapping 
allegations of unconstitutionality, the disposition of these Appeals may 
                                               
1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part. No person 
or entity other than amici curiae or their counsel made a monetary 
contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief. All parties 
consented to the filing of this Brief. 
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affect the rights of AAPS and its members. Association of American 
Physicians and Surgeons, Inc. v. Sebelius, Case No. 1:10-cv-0499-ABJ. 
 Amicus Guenter L. Spanknebel, M.D., privately practiced 
gastroenterology. He is a past president of the Massachusetts Medical 
Society and is currently chair of its History Committee. He has also 
served as a Trustee of the Health Foundation of Central Massachusetts 
and on the faculties of the medical schools at Tufts University and the 
University of Massachusetts. 
 Amicus Janis Chester, M.D., privately practices psychiatry in 
Delaware, serves as chair of the Department of Psychiatry at a 
community hospital, is a member of the faculty at Jefferson Medical 
College and holds a variety of positions with organized medicine and 
psychiatry, locally and nationally. 
 Amicus Mark J. Hauser, M.D. privately practices psychiatry and 
forensic psychiatry in Massachusetts and Connecticut.  
 Amicus Graham Spruiell, M.D., privately practices forensic 
psychiatry and psychoanalysis in the Boston area. 
 Amici have followed attempts in recent years to enact health care 
reform legislation.  As active members of the medical profession and 
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pursuant to their ethical obligations, Amici have carefully studied the 
introduction, passage and partial early implementation of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(“ACA”), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 
2010, Pub. L. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (“RA”). Amici have also filed a brief 
in support of The Commonwealth’s Rule 11 Petition to the United States 
Supreme Court. 
 For the reasons set forth below, Amici believe ACA is 
unconstitutional. If upheld, ACA will harm patients and undermine, in 
fundamental and dangerous ways, the practice of medicine.  Amici submit 
this brief in support of The Commonwealth and urge the Court to affirm 
Section 1501’s unconstitutionality and to further hold that Section 1501 is 
not severable from the remainder of ACA. 
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
 ACA has divided our nation prior to enactment, during enactment 
and since enactment. Cf. Abraham Lincoln, Speech of June 16, 
1858(Springfield, Ill.) reprinted in Yale Book of Quotations 460 (F.R. 
Shapiro ed. 2006)( “[a] house divided against itself cannot stand”). 
 The Commonwealth has challenged the constitutionality of the 
individual mandate contained in Section 1501 of ACA (“Section 1501”) and 
of ACA itself.  The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia held Section 1501 is unconstitutional and severable from the 
remainder of ACA and both parties appealed. Commonwealth of Virginia, 
ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 
2010)(“Virginia Action”), appeals docketed, Nos. 11-1057 & 1058 (4th 
Cir.)(“Virginia Appeal”).  The Commonwealth has also filed a Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari before Judgment.  United States Supreme Court Docket 
No. 10-1014.2  
 Besides Virginia, twenty-seven other states have challenged Section 
1501’s and ACA’s constitutionality.  Twenty-six states are plaintiffs in 
                                               
2 Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. 
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Florida v. United States Department of Health and Human Services (N.D. 
Fl.), Case No.: 3:10-cv-91(“Florida Action”), appeal docketed, No. 11-
11021-HH (11th Cir.) (“Florida Appeal”), where the court declared Section 
1501 to be unconstitutional and not severable from the remainder of 
ACA.3  Florida Action, Doc 151.  Conversely, in Liberty University v. 
Geithner, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2010 WL 4860299 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 
2010)(“Liberty Action”), appeal docketed, No.10-2347 (4th Cir.) (“Liberty 
Appeal”),4 Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F.Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. 
Mi. 2010)(“TMLC Action”), appeal docketed, No. 10-2388(6th Cir.)(“TMLC 
Appeal”),  and Mead v. Holder, __ F.Supp. 2d  ___, 2011 WL 611139 
(D.D.C.)(“Mead Action”), appeal docketed, 11-5047 (D.C. Cir.)(“Mead 
Appeal”), the courts found Congress has power to enact Section 1501 
under the Commerce Clause. In total, more than twenty cases have been 
commenced challenging ACA and its provisions. Plaintiffs/Appellants 
Petition for Initial En Banc Hearing, Mead Appeal, at 8 (“Mead En Banc 
Petition”).   
                                               
3 Oklahoma has also commenced a separate action. Oklahoma v. Sebelius, 
Case No.: 6:11-cv-00030 (E.D. Ok.). 
4 The Fourth Circuit ordered the Virginia Appeal to be heard in seriatum 
with the Liberty Appeal.  Virginia Appeal, Order dated Jan. 26, 2011. 
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 In addition to Section 1501, Amici believe that ACA contains scores 
of unconstitutional provisions which are not severable from the remainder 
of ACA.5  It is axiomatic that whenever a statute contains any 
unconstitutional provision that is not severable from the remainder of the 
statute, no provision of that statute may be treated as the Supreme Law 
of the Land pursuant to Article VI. U.S. CONST. art. VI.   
Consequently, quickly declaring ACA unconstitutional would 
unburden the federal Judiciary and the Executive Branch as well as the 
states from years of unnecessary and costly litigation.  Furthermore until 
ACA is declared unconstitutional states (including Virginia), consumers, 
employers and others would spend additional billions of dollars to comply 
with an unconstitutional statute and billions of dollars will be withdrawn 
from the Treasury based upon an unconstitutional law. Virginia’s daily 
expenditures to comply with ACA unquestionably provide it with standing 
to challenge ACA’s constitutionality. 
                                               
5 These provisions, including Section 1501, violate Article I, Section 7, 
Clause 2 of the Constitution (“Presentment Clause”) because they were 
simultaneously enacted and amended. See Section I, B, 1, infra.  
Furthermore, the test for severability should be reexamined because 
severance of an unconstitutional provision from a statute lacking a 
severability clause is a judicial line item veto, a judicial remedy which 
itself violates the Presentment Clause.  See Section II, infra. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Amici believe Congress lacks power to enact Section 1501 for two 
reasons.  First, there is no power to regulate commerce because there is no 
commerce. See U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3 (“Commerce Clause”). 
Second, Section 1501 fails to comply with the Constitution’s procedural 
requirements and substantive restrictions. Procedurally, Congress 
violated the Presentment Clause by simultaneously enacting and 
amending Section 1501. Substantively, Section 1501 invades the “private 
enclave” enjoyed by patients since the time of Hippocrates. See United 
States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980); 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  
The Secretary’s argument that Section 1501 is severable from ACA 
cannot succeed.   Congress has declared and The Secretary has argued 
that Section 1501 is “essential” to ACA. Furthermore, even if The 
Secretary could establish Section 1501’s severability under Alaska 
Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S.678 (1987), severance (from a statute lacking a 
severability clause) is a judicial line item veto that transfers legislative 
power from Congress to the judiciary in violation of the Bicameral and 
Presentment Clauses - ignoring the principles set forth in Clinton v. City 
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of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).  Severance is not, as previously held by 
the U.S. Supreme Court, a doctrine of judicial restraint.   Cf. Order 
Granting Summary Judgment, Florida Action, Doc 150 at 64; 
Memorandum Opinion, Virginia Action, Doc 161 at 40. 
The Court observed that “[s]everability is a doctrine of judicial 
restraint,” and that “just this past year,” the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed that courts should “try to limit the solution to the 
problem,” severing any problematic portions while leaving the 
remainder intact,” and that the normal rule is that partial 
invalidation is proper. Op. 64 (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. 
Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S.Ct. 3138, 3161 (2010).    
 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Clarify, Florida Action, 
Doc 156 (“Clarification Motion”) at 3. Rather, severance is a doctrine of 
judicial activism that allows, and possibly even encourages, constitutional 
sloppiness by Congress and the President.  In light of Clinton, Amici 
suggest Alaska Airlines and its progeny no longer apply. 
 
ARGUMENT 
I.  SECTION 1501 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL  
 “Every law enacted by Congress must be based on one or more of its 
powers enumerated in the Constitution.” United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598, 607 (2000); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 
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(1819). Those powers are constrained by the Constitution’s procedural 
requirements, see e.g., U.S. CONST., art. I, sec. 7, and substantive 
restrictions, see e.g., id. at sec. 9. 
A. Section 1501 is Not Based on Congress’ Power to Regulate 
Commerce  
 
 The Secretary has argued that Congress may enact Section 1501 
under the Commerce Clause.  Because Section 1501 does not involve any 
commerce, her argument fails.   
Since ACA was enacted last year, the question of whether Congress 
has the power to enact Section 1501 under the Commerce Clause has 
arisen in many cases. Section 1501 was upheld in the Liberty, Mead and 
TMLC Actions but was declared unconstitutional in the Florida and 
Virginia Actions.6   
Given the disparity of the opinions and the gravity of the issue, the 
question of Congressional power to enact Section 1501 should be decided 
by this Court.  Amici offer the following analysis to the Court.  
                                               
6 The courts in the Florida and Virginia Actions disagreed on whether 
Section 1501 is severable from ACA. The Virginia Action held Section 
1501 is severable. The Florida Action held it is not severable.  
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1. The individual mandate involves no commerce 
  Congress lacks power to enact Section 1501 under the Commerce 
Clause. The language and structure of article I, section 8 make this clear.  
Under clause 3, the power is “to regulate” and the object of that power is 
“commerce”. The Constitution does not give Congress power to regulate all 
commerce. Rather, the Constitution restricts Congress to regulating a set 
of only three types of commerce: (1) “with” the Indians; (2) “among” the 
several States; and (3) “with” foreign nations.  All three members of this 
set necessarily involve at least a dyad or pair of parties.  Without two or 
more parties, the words “with” and “among” are meaningless.   
 Therefore, in deciding this matter, the Court should undertake a 
two-step analysis. First, it should determine if Congress attempted to 
regulate “commerce.”  Only if this question is answered affirmatively, 
should the Court undertake step two, an analysis of the “interstate 
commerce” sub-clause.    
 With regard to step one, the key is to understand that “commerce” 
may be viewed as the interrelationship, traffic, agreement or transaction 
between parties.  For example, we may see vendors paired with vendees; 
sellers paired with buyers; lessors paired with lessees; borrowers paired 
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with lenders; and debtors paired with creditors.  Expressed in 
mathematical terms, “commerce” is Euclid’s line between two points or 
Einstein’s interval between two points on an ideal rigid body, where the 
points represent the two parties and the line or interval represents the 
commercial transaction, agreement, traffic or interrelationship. Euclid, 
Elements of Geometry 6 (Greek Text of J.L. Heiberg (1883-1885))(R. 
Fitzpatrick, ed. & translator) (“And the extremities of a line are points”); 
Albert Einstein, The Meaning of Relativity 4 (5th ed. 1956)(posthumously); 
cf., Paul A. Samuelson, Economics 3 (10th ed., 1976) (Similar to the 
definition of commerce, “economics” is defined as requiring at least a 
dyadic relationship. “Economics… is the study of those activities which, 
with or without money, involve exchange transactions among people”) 
(emphasis added).7  
 The U.S. Supreme Court has long understood and reiterated that 
“commerce”, by definition, necessarily involves two or more parties. 
                                               
7 Professor Samuelson’s treatise was the most popular economics textbook 
of the second half of the twentieth century. He was Economic Advisor to 
President Kennedy and received the second Nobel Prize in Economics in 
1970. Apparently, the 111th Congress, The Secretary and amici who 
support her, ignore Samuelson’s definition of “economics” in order to 
establish “substantial economic effects.”   
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The commerce power “is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe 
the rule by which commerce is to be governed …” The Gibbons 
Court, however, acknowledged that limitations on the commerce 
power are inherent in the very language of the Commerce Clause.  
It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that 
commerce, which is completely internal, which is carried on 
between man and man in a State, or between different parts of 
the same State, and which does not extend to or affect other 
States…. 
 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553 (1995)(quoting Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194-95 (1824)(Marshall, Ch. J.)(emphasis 
added). 
 While “commerce” may occur between two people, between two 
entities, or between a person and an entity, there is no “commerce” when 
a single person or entity is involved. Since Section 1501 is an individual 
mandate, it does not pertain to a transaction, agreement, traffic or 
interrelationship between two parties.  Rather Section 1501 attempts to 
regulate individuals where no counterparty exists. The individual 
mandate involves no “commerce”. Without “commerce”, there is no need to 
examine the interstate commerce sub-clause.   
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2. Courts may not rely on Section 1501’s “findings” to establish  
Congressional power under the Commerce Clause 
 
 Amici believe the “substantial effects” test leads to false positive 
results and should not be the sole basis to establish Section 1501’s 
constitutionality under the Commerce Clause. 
 The Secretary has pointed to a litany of Congressional “findings” to 
argue that Congress properly enacted Section 1501 under the Commerce 
Clause - on the basis that the lack of adequate insurance coverage has a 
substantial effect upon the economy. Defendant’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Virginia Action, Doc 91, at 4, 7, 8, 11-13, 15-16, 21, 26-27, 33 
(pointing to findings in §§ 1501(a) & 10106(a).  Applying this rationale, a 
court could easily find the other enumerated powers of Congress 
superfluous.  The powers to declare war, establish post offices, and 
provide exclusivity for inventors obviously have substantial economic 
effects.  Under The Secretary’s theory, these clauses are unnecessary.     
 While a court may refer to Congressional findings to support its 
conclusion that Congress has power to enact a provision, a court must be 
able to examine Congressional “findings” if judicial review is to have any 
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meaning.8  No deference is warranted.  In this case, Congress presented 
findings which were based on numerous assumptions and extrapolations, 
some of which contradict each other. Compare Sections 1501(a)(2)(E) and 
10106. 
Whenever Congress presents “findings”, those so-called “findings” 
are not facts at all, but rather something else - a conclusion based on a 
vote.  Congressional “findings” often involve numerous extrapolations 
based on a plethora of assumptions. More than a century ago, Mark 
Twain humorously expressed the dangers of extrapolation as follows:   
In the space of one hundred and seventy-six years the Lower 
Mississippi has shortened itself two hundred and forty-two miles.  
That is an average of a trifle over one mile and a third per year.  
Therefore, any calm person, who is not blind or idiotic, can see that 
in the Old Oolitic Silurian Period, just a million years ago next 
November, the Lower Mississippi River was upward of one million 
three hundred thousand miles long, and stuck out over the Gulf of 
Mexico like a fishing-rod.  And, by the same token any person can 
see that seven hundred and forty-two years from now the Lower 
Mississippi will be only a mile and three-quarters long…. 
                                               
8 When a court blindly accepts Congressional findings as facts, it amounts 
to a dereliction of its duties. Long ago, the U.S. Supreme Court said: “[i]t 
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say 
what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1Cr.) 137, 177 (1803). It is 
not free to “close [its] eyes on the Constitution, and see only the law, [e.g. 
ACA].” Id. at 178. 
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Daniel Huff, How to Lie with Statistics 142 (1954)(quoting Mark Twain, 
Life on the Mississippi).   
Saying something is a fact does not make it so. For example, under 
Section 1501(a)(2)(E), Congress made the following finding: “Half of all 
personal bankruptcies are caused in part by medical expenses….”   In 
Section 10106 (which amended Section 1501), Congress made the 
following contradictory finding: “62 percent of all personal bankruptcies 
are caused in part by medical expenses.” It is impossible for both 
“findings” to be true.  Perhaps, neither is true. 
 Considering this internal contradiction and the inherent dangers 
associated with extrapolating a decade into the future, Amici respectfully 
suggest that the Court not defer to the Congressional findings concerning 
Section 1501 to establish the power of Congress to enact the individual 
mandate. Rather, the Court should question the validity of the underlying 
assumptions and extrapolations.  
B. Congress May Not Violate Constitutional Constraints 
 
It is axiomatic that a federal law must comply with the entire 
Constitution as amended.  ACA has not come close. As physicians, Amici 
are concerned by the mandated invasion of patient privacy required by 
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ACA.  As citizens, Amici are concerned that Congress repeatedly violated 
the Presentment Clause by simultaneously enacting and amending many 
of ACA’s provisions, including Section 1501. Therefore, the Court should 
affirm the unconstitutionality of Section 1501. 
1. Section 1501 may not be enacted and amended simultaneously 
Congress has simultaneously enacted Sections 1501 and 10106 of 
ACA. The former provision creates 26 U.S.C. §5000A, 124 Stat. at 244, 
while the latter provision revises some portions of 26 U.S.C. §5000A, 124 
Stat. at 909.  These provisions contain incompatible definitions of “penalty 
amount.” 
Congress may not simultaneously enact and revise any provision 
within the same statute because that simultaneity violates the 
Presentment Clause, the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively 
considered, procedure” which is used to enact Federal legislation.  
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 
951(1983); Clinton, 524 U.S. at 439-440.  
 Although simultaneously enacting and revising 26 U.S.C. §5000A 
may have led to needless complexity, incongruity, and ambiguity for our 
citizenry and judiciary, the critical constitutional problem is that both the 
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original and revised versions of Section 5000A were presented to the 
President at the same time. Consequently, 26 U.S.C. §5000A did not exist 
at the times the House and Senate passed H.R. 3590 nor did it exist when 
H.R. 3590 was presented to the President.  Consequently, Section 10106 
merely attempts to amend a nullity.  For 26 U.S.C. §5000A to be 
revisable, Section 10106 must be enacted after section 1501, not 
simultaneously with it.   
 Under the Presentment Clause, the President may only approve or 
veto a bill in its entirety. Because Sections 1501 and 10106 contained 
incompatible definitions of “penalty amount,” it is impossible for the 
President to have approved H.R. 3590 (which became ACA) in its entirety. 
The President’s approval of the definition in 1501 contradicted the 
definition presented to him in 10106 and the President’s approval of the 
definition in 10106 contradicted the definition in 1501. The incompatible 
definitions of “penalty amount” contained in Sections 1501 and 10106 
prevented the House and Senate from having agreed on the definition of 
“penalty amount.”  In other words, the House’s definition under 1501 
negated the Senate’s definition under 10106 and the House’s definition 
under 10106 negated the Senate’s definition under 1501.  
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 “[R]epeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform to Art. 
I.” Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438.  The same principle applies to revisions and 
amendment of statutes.  Consequently, 26 U.S.C. §5000A should not have 
been enacted and revised within the same statute.  This unconstitutional 
practice completely infects ACA. Indeed, pursuant to Title X, Congress 
attempted to simultaneously enact and amend more than ninety ACA 
provisions.9  
During debate over the Constitution’s ratification, James Madison 
stated that laws should be understandable, not too long, and “not be 
revised before they are promulgated.”  THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 
381(Madison) (C. Rossiter, ed. 1961). He wrote: 
The internal effects of a mutable policy are still more calamitous. It 
poisons the blessings of liberty itself. It will be of little avail to the 
people that the laws are made by men of their own choice if the laws 
be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that 
they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they 
are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, 
who knows what the law is today, can guess what it will be 
tomorrow.  Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be 
a rule, which is little known, and less fixed? 
 
Id. (emphasis added). Congress ignored Madison’s prescient warning and 
passed H.R. 3590, a 2400 page bill, which became ACA upon the 
                                               
9 124 Stat. at 883-1024.   
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President’s signature. Within days of passing ACA, Congress also passed 
H.R. 4872 which became the Reconciliation Act. 
  Given ACA’s length and the number of simultaneously enacted and 
amended provisions, James Madison surely would have considered ACA 
too long and too incoherent to be understood. Indeed, ACA’s length and 
complexity have not gone unnoticed.  See Order, Florida Action, Doc 167 
at 16 (“[ACA], as previously noted, is obviously very complicated and 
expansive. It contains about 450 separate provisions with different time 
schedules for implementation.”); see also Michael O. Leavitt, “Health 
reform’s central flaw: Too much power in one office,” Washington Post 
(February 18, 2011)(referring to nearly 2000 powers given to The 
Secretary by ACA); see also Ernst & Young, LLP, Summary of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, incorporating The Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act (May 2010)(This summary is presented in a 
small font and is 159 pages long). 
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2. Congress may not invade a patient’s privacy  
The individual mandate is an assault on the confidentiality of the 
physician- patient relationship.10  For more than two millennia, 
physicians and patients have understood that a patient receives better 
care if the patient candidly discloses private information, e.g. medical 
history, symptoms, and treatments, to the physician.  U.S. Congress, 
Office of Technology Assessment, Protecting Privacy in Computerized 
Medical Information, OTA-TCT-576 (pages 5-6, 26-30)(U.S. G.P.O., Sept. 
1993). To mandate the purchase of medical insurance and then to require 
disclosure of  that insurance is tantamount to providing the government, 
as well as entities it outsources to, with a roadmap to patients’ medical 
information.  Under the Constitution, a patient has a right to a “private 
enclave” where his or her medical care and information are private. The 
individual mandate obliterates that enclave.    
In Westinghouse, the Third Circuit eloquently applied the “private 
enclave” principle to a case involving confidentiality of medical 
information: 
                                               
10 This assault is compounded by Section 1502’s compelled disclosure of 
coverage. 
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There can be no question that an employee’s medical records, which 
may contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are well within the 
ambit of materials entitled to privacy protection.  Information about 
one’s body and state of health is matter which the individual is 
ordinarily entitled to retain within the “private enclave where he 
may lead a private life.” 
 
Id. at 577 (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d 
Cir. 1956)(Frank, J., dissenting), rev’d, 353 U.S. 391 (1957)).  In 
Grunewald, Judge Frank said: 
That right is the hallmark of our democracy.  The totalitarian 
regimes scornfully reject that right. They regard privacy as an 
offense against the state.  Their goal is utter depersonalization.  
They seek to convert all that is private into the totally public, to 
wipe out all unique “private worlds,” leaving a “public world” only, a 
la Orwell’s terrifying book, “1984.”  They boast of the resultant 
greater efficiency in obtaining all the evidence in criminal 
prosecutions.  We should know by now that their vaunted efficiency 
too often yields, unjust, cruel decisions, based upon unreliable 
evidence procured at the sacrifice of privacy.  We should be aware of 
moving in the direction of totalitarian methods, as we will do if we 
eviscerate any of the constitutional privileges.  
 
Grunewald, 223 F.2d at 582.  Previously, Judge Frank described the right 
to a “private enclave” in United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 315-16 (2d 
Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., dissenting), aff’d, 343 U.S.747 (1952):   
“A man can still control a small part of his environment, his house; 
he can retreat thence from outsiders, secure in the knowledge that 
they cannot get at him without disobeying the Constitution.  That is 
still a sizable hunk of liberty – worth protecting from encroachment.  
A sane, decent, civilized society must provide some oasis, some 
shelter from public scrutiny, some insulated enclosure, some 
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enclave, some inviolate place which is a man’s castle.”   
 
On Lee, 193 F.2d at 315-16.11 
The right to a “private enclave” underlies Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment jurisprudence. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460; Murphy v. 
Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 
(1964)(privilege against self-incrimination); Tehan v. United States ex rel. 
Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415-16 (1966)(both the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments involve the “right of the individual to be let alone”); 
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709,717 (1987)(Fourth Amendment rights of 
public employees).  
In Miranda, the Court showed a concern regarding creeping 
encroachments on individual liberties and also quoted Grunewald at a 
crucial point in its analysis: 
Those who framed the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were 
aware of subtle encroachments on individual liberty.  They knew 
that “illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first 
footing … by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal 
modes of procedure… The privilege was elevated to constitutional 
status and has always been “as broad as the mischief against which 
it seeks to guard…” 
Thus we may view the historical development of the privilege 
                                               
11 This passage was quoted in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 
511-12 n.4 (1961). 
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[against self-incrimination] as one which groped for the proper scope 
of governmental power over the citizen. As a “noble principle often 
transcends its origins,” the privilege has come rightfully to be 
recognized in part as an individual’s substantive right, a “right to a 
private enclave where he may lead a private life. That right is the 
hallmark of our democracy.” [Grunewald, 233 F.2d at 579, 581-582]. 
We have recently noted that the privilege against self-incrimination 
– the essential mainstay of our adversary system – is founded on a 
complex of values … All these policies point to one overriding 
thought: the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is 
the respect a government – state or federal – must accord to the 
dignity and integrity of its citizens. 
 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 459-60(emphasis added)(citations omitted). 
 To protect personal medical information, the most private of private 
enclaves, an individual must be allowed to pay for medical care directly 
and not be required to purchase health insurance. Typically, at the 
moment a health insurance carrier enrolls an individual, it requires that 
individual to disclose his or her complete medical history. See, e.g., 
Empire BlueCross/BlueShield Form ENR-02968 (Rev1/11) at 5.  
Furthermore, as an insurance carrier pays claims to physicians, hospitals, 
pharmacies, etc., on an individual’s health insurance policy, the carrier 
amasses more of that individual’s private medical information.  By forcing 
individuals to purchase medical insurance, ACA destroys a patient’s right 
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and ability to keep medical information private.12  
To put a patient’s constitutional rights in perspective, consider the 
victim and perpetrator of a violent crime. While Miranda allows a 
perpetrator to retreat into a “private enclave,” ACA appears to prevent a 
victim-patient from totally remaining silent by compelling the victim-
patient to disclose certain private information.  The victim-patient’s 
private enclave is thereby compromised.  The victim-patient is put in a 
worse position than his or her alleged attacker.  
II. ACA IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE SECTION 1501 IS 
NOT SEVERABLE 
 
The traditional test for severability is well-known:   
“The standard for determining the severability of an 
unconstitutional provision is well established: Unless it is evident 
that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which 
are within its power, independently of that which is not, the invalid 
part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law.” 
Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987)(internal quotation 
marks omitted). While the Act itself contains no statement of 
whether its provisions are severable, “[i]n the absence of a 
                                               
12 The risk of loss of private information is real.  Today, many private 
insurers, federal agencies and their respective business associates 
outsource at least part of their operations. GAO, PRIVACY: Domestic and 
Offshore Outsourcing of Personal Information in Medicare, Medicaid, and 
TRICARE, Report No. 06-676 (Sept. 2006). Therefore, a patient has little 
actual knowledge or control over who sees his or her confidential 
information.   
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severability clause,… Congress’ silence is just that – silence – and 
does not raise a presumption against severability.” Id. at 686….  
 
New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 186 (1992).  Nor, as a matter of logic and 
judicial consistency, should that Congressional silence raise a 
presumption in favor of severability. 
The Secretary is prevented from arguing that Section 1501 is 
severable if it is unconstitutional because she repeatedly admitted that 
the individual mandate is “essential” to ACA. Defendant’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Virginia Action Doc 91 at 1, 13-16, 25-29;  Order 
Granting Summary Judgment,  Florida Action Doc 150 at 63-64 (“the 
defendants concede that [the individual mandate] is absolutely necessary 
for the Act’s insurance market reforms to work as intended. In fact, they 
refer to it as an ‘essential’ part of the Act at least fourteen times in their 
motion to dismiss”); Brief for Appellant, Virginia Appeal, Doc 21 at 34-39; 
Clarification Order at 6-8.  
Furthermore, neither Section 1501 nor any other unconstitutional 
provision in ACA may be severed to save the remainder of ACA because 
severance is a judicial line item veto.   In Clinton, Presidential line item 
vetoes were declared unconstitutional. 524 U.S. at 447-449. In Chadha, 
Congressional vetoes were declared unconstitutional.  462 U.S. at 959.  
Case: 11-1057     Document: 110-1      Date Filed: 04/04/2011      Page: 33
26 
 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has, on occasion, severed defective 
provisions of federal statutes, see e.g., Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S.678, that 
remedy should be unavailable to courts in light of Clinton and Chadha. 
The Bicameral and Presentment Clauses require the House and Senate to 
pass precisely the same text – not a single word or punctuation may vary 
between the bills passed by each chamber. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 448.  The 
judiciary, like the President, has no power to rewrite a statute.  
Furthermore, the idea that the judiciary be joined with the executive in a 
“council of revision” was considered and expressly rejected by the Drafters 
of the Constitution. Brief of Senators Robert C. Byrd, Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan, and Carl Levin as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees 9-10 in 
Clinton v. City of New York (Docket No. 97-1374).  
In addition to violating the Constitution’s letter and spirit, the 
practice of severing a defective provision from a statute lacking a 
severability clause is bad policy because: (1) it facilitates legislative 
sloppiness – a bill’s author knows the constitutionality of its provisions 
will be addressed piecemeal; (2) it allows judicial activism - a court can 
substitute its own judgment for the legislative bargain that was struck in 
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Congress and agreed to by the President;13  and (3) it encourages omnibus 
legislation – which members of Congress may not have sufficient time to 
read and understand prior to casting their votes.14 
Regardless of the deference accorded to Congress, this Court may 
not sever a defective provision from a statute in the absence of a 
severability clause because severance is a judicial line item veto.  This 
practice substantially alters the dispersion of powers incorporated into the 
Constitution.  It is time to return “all legislative power” to Congress as 
required by the Constitution’s first clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 1, cl. 1. 
                                               
13 Congress, like other legislatures, is an institution that is conducive to 
vote trading and log-rolling activities. To enact a law, a majority coalition 
must be formed.  Consequently, members of Congress often cooperate to 
further an individual or collective agenda. Passage of a bill might require 
the vote of a single member of Congress or Senator.  If ACA had contained 
a severability clause, the legislative bargain made by members of 
Congress probably would not have been reached.  Indeed, a severability 
clause was included in an early version of H.R. 3590, but was excluded 
from ACA, as enacted.      
14 The Presentment Clause directs “reconsideration” of vetoed bills - 
implicitly requiring members of Congress to actually “consider” a bill. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, Amici believe that this Court should 
affirm that Section 1501 is unconstitutional but reverse with respect to its 
severability and find that Section 1501 is not severable from the 
remainder of ACA.  
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